Wajahat Ali Khan
Yes — both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have repeatedly said they want changes to the current international system. They often describe their goal as creating a “multipolar world order,” meaning a world where power is spread among several major countries rather than dominated by the United States and its allies.
The talks about this when the both leaders met in Beijing earlier this week.
For much of the post-Cold War era, the United States and its Western allies shaped the global political and economic system. Institutions such as NATO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund reflected Western influence, while democracy and free-market capitalism were promoted as universal models. Today, however, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping appear increasingly determined to challenge that dominance and reshape the balance of global power.
The question is no longer whether Moscow and Beijing are dissatisfied with the current international system. They clearly are. The deeper question is whether they are actively trying to create a new world order — and if so, what that order might look like.
Russia’s motivations are easier to understand. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow has viewed the expansion of NATO and Western political influence as a direct threat to its security and prestige. Putin has repeatedly argued that the West ignored Russian concerns and treated Russia as a defeated power rather than an equal partner. His invasion of Ukraine, despite widespread condemnation, can also be interpreted as part of a broader attempt to push back against Western influence and restore Russia’s status as a major geopolitical force.
China’s ambitions are more complex and more strategic. Unlike Russia, China has greatly benefited from the existing global economic system. It became the world’s second-largest economy through international trade, investment and globalization. Yet Beijing increasingly believes that the current order unfairly favours Western powers politically, militarily and technologically. Xi Jinping’s government speaks often about a “multipolar world” — one in which power is distributed among several major nations rather than concentrated in Washington.
Together, Russia and China have strengthened diplomatic, military and economic ties. They cooperate in organisations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, presenting themselves as defenders of sovereignty against what they call Western interference. They also promote alternatives to Western-led financial systems and seek stronger influence in Africa, Latin America and Asia.
Still, it would be inaccurate to suggest that Moscow and Beijing share identical goals. Russia often acts as a disruptive power, willing to use military confrontation to weaken Western unity. China, by contrast, generally prefers long-term economic and technological competition. Beijing’s leaders seek influence without necessarily dismantling the global trading system from which China profits enormously.
Nor is a “new world order” necessarily a coherent blueprint waiting to replace the old one. The emerging reality may instead be a more fragmented and competitive world: one with rival power centres, contested rules and declining Western dominance. In such a world, countries in the Global South may have greater room to manoeuvre between competing blocs.
Whether this transition leads to greater balance or greater instability remains uncertain. What is clear is that the era of unquestioned Western supremacy is fading. Putin and Xi may not agree on every detail of the future, but both are working to ensure that the next chapter of global politics is not written in Washington alone.
